Investment in the absence of property rights: the role of incumbency advantages by Konrad, Kai A.
www.ssoar.info
Investment in the absence of property rights: the
role of incumbency advantages
Konrad, Kai A.
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Konrad, K. A. (2001). Investment in the absence of property rights: the role of incumbency advantages. (Discussion
Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie,
01-18). Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-
ssoar-115291
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
  
  
WISSENSCHAFTSZENTRUM BERLIN 
FÜR SOZIALFORSCHUNG  
discussion papers 
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
CENTER BERLIN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FS IV 01 – 18 
 
 
Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: 
the Role of Incumbency Advantages  
 
 
Kai A. Konrad 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oktober 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN Nr. 0722 - 6748 
 
 Forschungsschwerpunkt 
 Markt und politische Ökonomie   
 
 Research Area 
 Markets and Political Economy  
  
Zitierweise/Citation: 
 
Kai A. Konrad, Investment in the Absence of Property 
Rights: the Role of Incumbency Advantages,  Discussion 
Paper FS IV 01-18, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 2001. 
 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH, 
Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Tel. (030) 2 54 91 – 0 
Internet: www.wz-berlin.de
ABSTRACT 
Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: the Role of Incumbency Advantages  
by Kai A. Konrad* 
In many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest 
for appropriating this output. This paper analyses the investment incentives of such 
agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest. Depending on the 
advantages, an increase in the productivity of the investment can decrease or increase 
the amount of investment. The results are applied to autocrats' investment behavior and 
job specific investment in organizations. 
 
Keywords: Investment, endogenous property rights, contests, incumbency advantage, 
proprietary states  
JEL classification: D23, D72, D74, H54, O10, P16 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Investitionsanreize bei unvollständigen Eigentumsrechten: die Rolle von 
Asymmetrien in Aneignungskonflikten 
Häufig finden sich Investoren in der folgenden Situation: Sie müssen über die Höhe von 
Investitionen entscheiden. Diese Investitionen generieren einen Ertrag. Der Ertrag 
fliesst aber nicht notwendigerweise den Investoren zu, sondern die Investoren müssen 
sich mit anderen Akteuren um die Aneignung dieser Erträge streiten. Diese Arbeit 
untersucht die Anreize für solche Investitionen und die Bedeutung von einseitigen 
Wettbewerbsvorteilen der Investoren in diesem Konflikt für ihre Investitionsanreize. In 
Abhängigkeit von den Vorteilen der Investoren (den „incumbency advantages“) in den 
Aneignungskonflikten kann eine allgemeine Steigerung der Produktivität der Investition 
zu einer Zunahme oder einem Rückgang der gleichgewichtigen Investitionshöhe führen. 
Die theoretischen Ergebnisse finden Anwendungen für die Erklärung des Verhaltens 
von Diktatoren, aber auch für das individuelle Investitionsverhalten von Managern in 
Organisationen.  
                                                 
*  I thank Eberhard Feess, Herschel Grossman, Stergios Skaperdas, Heinrich Ursprung, participants at 
seminars in Mannheim, Frankfurt a. Main and Berlin and at conferences at the University of California 
at Irvine and New Orleans and three referees for many valuable comments and suggestions. 
1 Intro duct i on
Agents who have an investment opportunity face a hold-up problem if they
cannot be sure to appropriate the returns on their investment. This is a well
known problem.1 In this paper a related, and possibly more serious problem
is considered. In the absence of property rights, agents will typically enter
contests in which they compete with rivals and spend resources in order to
improve their own chances of appropriating these returns. Accordingly, if
the investment is large and it generates a large return, the agent will also
spend more resources in the contest in which he tries to appropriate this
return. These conflict costs constitute a welfare loss. Further, they reduce the
expected net payoﬀ from investing, making investment also less attractive.
The idea that appropriation costs are a major source of welfare losses has
been discussed in the context of lobbying and rent-seeking. Originating with
Tullock (1980), there has been much work which considers the properties
of appropriation contests. For a survey see Nitzan (1994). More recently,
the implications of appropriation contests for strategic behavior have also
been considered. For instance, comparative productivity advantage matters
in conflicts (Skaperdas, 1992), future conflict may change today’s incentives
to trade with future rivals (Skaperdas, 1998), and future conflict may aﬀect
current production and current contest activities (Garfinkel and Skaperdas,
2000) and the incentives to form alliances (Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 2001).
This paper considers a related strategic issue. An agent who knows he
will participate in a contest for some prize in the future considers spending
resources by which the agent can increase the size of the prize. As the size of
the prize is observed and aﬀects rivals’ contest eﬀort, there is a strategic eﬀect
— lower investment reduces the rival’s contest eﬀort. The paper particularly
considers the role of incumbency advantages for investment. The investment
disincentives from the contest are more substantial if the contest advantage
of the investor is small, and can be prohibitive if the agent has no advantage
in the contest. Two types of advantage are distinguished. The agent may win
without any eﬀort even if his rival expends eﬀort up to some critical eﬀort
level. This advantage will be called a headstart advantage. In addition,
the incumbent may be more eﬃcient in the contest and generate the same
increase in win probability in the contest with a smaller increase in his contest
eﬀort. We call this a productivity advantage. The comparative statics are
surprising. For instance, an increase in the productivity of investment, or
in the share of the investment that can be appropriated by the winner of
1See, for instance, Eaton and Gersovitz (1983) and Schnitzer (1995) in the context of
foreign direct investment, and Konrad, Olsen and Schöb (1994) on investment in natural
resource extraction under exogenous expropriation threats.
1
the contest, may reduce the equilibrium amount invested. As a corollary, an
increase in the share of investment returns that goes to neither the investor
nor his rival but, for instance, to a third party, may increase investment.
Two applications are discussed. First, the paper can contribute to ex-
plaining the investment behavior in ’proprietary states’, that is, states ruled
by dictators who extract revenue from the country and try to maximize the
present value of this revenue. Olson (1993) and McGuire and Olson (1996),
for instance, compare a dictator to an entrepreneur and consider the coun-
try as the dictator’s firm. They analyze the dictator’s incentives to invest
in public infrastructure or education, whereby he maximizes the discounted
present value of tax revenues (his profit) that he can collect. If the dictator
provides an additional unit of public input, this increases the output he can
draw on in the future. Indeed, many countries seem to be run by this type
of dictator,2 but their investment behavior is very diﬀerent.3 Note that such
dictators also have to fight to stay in power (Grossman, 1999). For instance,
the frequent conflicts and civil wars in dictatorial states (see, e.g. Collier,
2001, for data sources and an analysis), suggest that this is a major concern
for dictators.4 We will confront the theory outcomes with some piecemeal
evidence on proprietary states later.5
2Many dicators spent decades in oﬃce and ruled their countries like farms or enterprises,
but did not invest. Examples are Rafael Trujillo who was in oﬃce from 1930 to 1961
in Dominican Republic, the Somoza family [1937-1979] in Nicaragua, Ferdinand Marcos
[1965-1986] in Phillipines, the Duvaliers [1957-1981] in Haiti, or Mobutu [1965-1997] in
Zaire, all of whom basically extracted revenue, accumulated private wealth, and disinvested
in public infrastructure. For a survey and discussion, see for example Robinson (1999).
3Even among countries with seemingly similar structures of dictatorial governance,
some countries do very well and other countries do not. For instance, during the
last decades some dictatorships in Southeast Asia had excellent economic performances,
whereas other dictatorships, particularly in Africa, became poorer (e.g., Collins and Both-
worth, 1996, Easterly and Levine, 1997). Alesina and Perotti (1994, p. 353) also report
that dictatorships’ performance is far from homogenous.
4Skaperdas (2001) and Konrad and Skaperdas (1999) develop a theory of endogenous
property rights and property rights protection agencies. Conflict for governance turns out
to be a major source of welfare losses.
5A related literature on economic performance or growth has considered security of
property rights of private investors and common pool problems between groups that com-
pete for redistribution. For some examples, further references and related ideas see, e.g.,
Besley (1995), Easterly and Levine (1997), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Persson, Roland
and Tabellini (1997), and Tornell and Lane (1999). Insecure private property rights and
private rent seeking activities have similar eﬀects on private actions (e.g., low savings, or
capital flight). It is likely that both types of property rights issues contribute to explaining
poor economic performance. They are not mutually exclusive and may often complement
each other. Indeed, a dictator’s insecure property rights may induce policies (e.g., possi-
ble expropriation, or extortionary taxation) that create uncertainty and insecure property
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A second application is on organizations. Consider a manager who has to
decide how much eﬀort to invest in (re)-organizing the unit which is under
his supervision, in an environment with incomplete contracts. If a manager
spends much eﬀort today, the eﬃciency of his unit may improve. The man-
ager bears the investment cost of his time and eﬀort. The benefits accrue to
the person who manages this unit in the future: if the unit operates more
eﬃciently, the manager’s job is usually easier. Particularly if these eﬀorts
and their results are observable but not verifiable,6 the manager’s job will be
more attractive for rival candidates if the manager expends a lot of eﬀort.
Hence, a manager who has invested a lot may have to expend more resources
on influence activities7 in trying to fend oﬀ rival managers who may lobby
for appropriating these gains. We will briefly consider the implications of
this eﬀect for firm profitability and CEO turnover.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the model and explains how
it relates to the decision problems of dictators in proprietary states and
managers in organizations. Section 3 solves for the equilibrium. Section
4 discusses comparative statics. Section 5 relates these equilibrium results
to some observations about proprietary states and organizations. Section 6
discusses robustness and extensions, and section 7 concludes.
2 Investment and contests for power
To address these issues more formally, the following two-period framework is
considered.8 In period 1 an agent is in charge of making an investment deci-
sion in this period. This agent is called the period-1 incumbent. He chooses
investment k and this investment is a cost for the incumbent. This investment
pays oﬀ in period 2, and the total output generated is a function y = f(k).
This function has standard properties of a production function; f(k) is twice
continuously diﬀerentiable with positive and decreasing marginal productiv-
ity. The incumbent in period 2 appropriates some share 0 ≤ T (y) ≤ y of
this output. Here, the appropriation function T is assumed to be (weakly)
increasing in y, and (weakly) concave. It will be convenient to define the
rights for the private sector.
6The problem disappears if the manager and his superior can write a contract that
specifies the amount and type of investment, and who receives the returns on the invest-
ment.
7For a formal contest set-up of influence activities, see Ellingsen (1997).
8The analysis here can be generalized to an infinite time horizon model and the results
carry over to Markov perfect equilibria in such a set-up.
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amount of returns that can be appropriated as
B(k) ≡ T (f(k)), (1)
with B0(k) > 0, B00(k) < 0. In order to concentrate on interior solutions,
we make the following assumptions: B(0) = 0, limk→0B0(k) = ∞, and
limk→∞B
0(k) = 0.
The incumbent in period 1 is not necessarily the incumbent in period 2.
At the end of period 1 an agent (”she”, called the rival) shows up. The
rival has an opportunity to challenge the period-1 incumbent in a contest.
Whether the period-1 incumbent or the rival will earn the returns B(k) in
period 2 depends on the contest eﬀorts of the period-1 incumbent and the
rival. We analyze how the properties of the function B(k) and the properties
of the contest determine the investment behavior.
The contest for incumbency in period 2 that takes place at the end of
period 1 is described as follows. The incumbent and the rival spend contest
eﬀorts w and w¯, respectively. A contest success function
q(w, w¯) =



1
1/2
0


 if



w > bw¯ − a
w = bw¯ − a
w < bw¯ − a


 (2)
determines the incumbent’s win probability as a function of contest eﬀorts.
The incumbent wins if w > bw¯ − a. He loses if w < bw¯ − a, and a coin
is tossed to determine who wins in the case of a tie. The rival wins with
probability 1− q(w, w¯).
If b = 1 and a = 0 in (2), the contest is perfectly symmetric. However,
incumbents may often have incumbency advantages. The contest success
function (2) allows for two types of such advantages. If, for instance, b = 1
and a > 0, there is a situation in which the incumbent has some headstart
advantage. He wins even if he spends a units of contest eﬀort less than the
rival. A second type of incumbency advantage is described by the parameter
b. It measures a relative eﬀectiveness advantage of the incumbent’s eﬀort.
If, for instance, b < 1 and a = 0, the incumbent needs only w = bw¯ units
of eﬀort to match the eﬀect of his rival’s eﬀort w¯. The two types of incum-
bency advantage may exist simultaneously. Throughout, we assume that the
incumbent has some an incumbency advantage, or at least no disadvantage:
b ∈ (0, 1] and a ≥ 0.
Contest success functions as in (2) are frequently used.9 The results in
this paper are derived for this contest success function. As will be discussed
9Variants of this contest success function are used to describe contests in various fields
ranging from law and economics, R&D, lobbying, advertizing and sales contests, litigation,
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in section 4, the results qualitatively generalize to contest success functions
for which the winning probability is a continuous function of contest eﬀorts.
The incumbent in period 1 maximizes the expected discounted sum of
net revenue. His payoﬀ Ω can be written as
Ω = −k − w + q(w, w¯)B(k). (3)
He spends resources k ≥ 0 on investment and then chooses his contest eﬀort
w ≥ 0. He wins the contest with probability q(w, w¯), in which case he obtains
B(k) in period 2.
The rival’s payoﬀ function is given by
Φ = −w¯ + (1− q(w, w¯))B(k). (4)
The rival also spends contest eﬀort w¯ ≥ 0 at the end of period 1, simultane-
ously with the incumbent. The rival wins with probability 1− q(w, w¯) and,
in this case, becomes the incumbent in period 2 who obtains the period-2
payoﬀ B(k). In order to economize on notation, we assumed for (3) and (4)
that the discount factors of both the period-1 incumbent and his rival are
equal to 1.
The timing of the game can be summarized as follows. In period 1 the
incumbent decides about investment k. This choice becomes observable. Now
the incumbent and an entrant simultaneously choose their contest eﬀorts.10
In period 2 the investment pays oﬀ and B(k) is received by the agent who is
the incumbent in period 2.
Before describing the equilibrium, we consider how the set-up fits with
proprietary states or manager’s decisions to invest eﬀort. In the proprietary
state, k is what the ruler refrains from appropriating today11 in order to
generate output f(k) tomorrow, with B(k) the amount of this output that
and lotteries, to political campaigns. See, e.g., Hirshleifer and Riley (1992), Ellingsen
(1991), and Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1998) for examples and further references. See
also section 6 for a discussion.
10The incumbent is not cash constrained as regards his expenditure for investment or
for contest eﬀort, and it will be assumed that the rival also does not have an upper limit
of eﬀort that may become binding in the equilibrium. This will be discussed in section 4.
11This public investment can be defined narrowly as public education, or public in-
frastructure investment, or can include the abstinence from short sighted policies such as
loose monetary policy that leads to some immediate seigniorage but has inflation costs
in the medium and long run, protectionist trade policy that generates some immediate
revenue from tariﬀs and licenses but distorts the economy and slows down growth, or
the ruler may excessively tax domestic or foreign investors, a policy that also yields some
immediate revenue but destroys trust and credibility and leads to capital flight or deters
future foreign direct investment.
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will be appropriated by the period-2 ruler.12 The contest is between the
ruler and some opposition. Rivals could be rulers of neighboring countries
who think about military conquest, or rival elites or power groups within
the country. The nature of the incumbency advantage depends on the type
of conflict. The contest could be an election. For elections, incumbency
advantages are well documented (see, e.g., Mueller, 1989, p.185 for a survey).
For military conflict or civil war, the incumbency advantage measures how
much easier it is to defend than to attack. Incumbency advantages of a
ruler may also be rooted in history or culture. For instance, leadership in
former secession or independence wars, monarchy, or religious leadership may
provide such advantages.
If the incumbent is a manager, the investment k can best be seen as
time and other opportunity cost which the manager invests in making his
unit more eﬃcient. B(k) then is the additional rent which the manager who
runs this unit in period 2 receives from the fact that the eﬃciency of the
unit has been increased. Outsiders (possibly from within the firm, possibly
from outside the firm) may contest with the manager for taking over this
manager’s position, or for appropriating the gains from his eﬀort in some
other way, for instance, by restructuring the firm, or by relocating tasks and
responsibilities within the firm.13
3 Investment in the equilibrium
The contest considered is a generalization of the first-price all-pay auction
that has been analyzed by Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye, Kovenock and
deVries (1996). The equilibrium for a prize of given size B(k) is described as
Lemma 1 For a given prize of size B, if the contestants can make simulta-
neous eﬀort choices w ≥ 0 and w¯ ≥ 0, the contest equilibrium with contest
success function (2) is given as follows:
(i) If B > a
b
there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. The (unique) mixed
strategy equilibrium is characterized by probability distribution functions F (w)
and F¯ (w¯) for the incumbent’s and the rival’s contest eﬀorts w ≥ 0 and
w¯ ≥ 0, respectively, with
F (w) =
½
a
bB
+ 1
bB
w for w ∈ [0, bB − a]
1 for w > bB − a (5)
12More explicit models of predatory states providing some microfoundation for this
function B(k) include Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Konrad and Skaperdas (1999) and
Moselle and Pollak (2001).
13Such contest activities are discussed as influence activities, e.g., in Milgrom (1988),
and explicitly modeled as a contest in Ellingsen (1997).
6
and
F¯ (w¯) =



1− b+ a
B
for w¯ ∈ [0, a
b
)
1− b+ b
B
w¯ for w¯ ∈ [a
b
, B)
1 for w¯ > B
(6)
(ii) The unique equilibrium in a contest for a prize 0 ≤ B ≤ a
b
is w = w¯ = 0.
A proof is relegated to the Appendix. To make this outcome intuitively
plausible, note first that, for B > a
b
≥ 0, a pure strategy equilibrium cannot
exist. Suppose (w, w¯) is a pure strategy equilibrium. Suppose w = 0 in this
equilibrium. Then the rival would choose some w¯ = a/b+ ε, just enough to
win the contest. But w = 0 is not an optimal answer to this w¯. Suppose
that w > 0. The rival’s optimal response to this w is either w¯(w) = 0,
or w¯(w) = w
b
+ a
b
+ ε for some arbitrarily small positive ε. But then this
w > 0 is not an optimal response to w¯(w) = 0, nor to w¯(w) = w
b
+ a
b
+
ε. This shows that (w, w¯) cannot be an equilibrium. Second, consider the
properties of the mixed strategy equilibrium. Note that no contestant will
spend eﬀort that exceeds his or her valuation of the prize. The rival will not
spend more than B. Given that the rival will not spend more than B, the
incumbent’s eﬀort should not exceed (bB − a) by a strictly positive amount,
because (bB − a) would be suﬃcient to make his win probability equal to
1. This limits the possible equilibrium eﬀorts from above. The incumbent
chooses zero eﬀort with strictly positive probability mass a
bB
. Given a positive
headstart advantage (a > 0), the incumbent wins in this case with probability
(1−b+ a
B
). The rival, who has payoﬀ equal to zero in the equilibrium, chooses
zero eﬀort with positive probability mass (1− b+ a
B
). She loses in this case
with probability one. Further, it is not reasonable for the rival to spend eﬀort
w¯ ∈ (0, a
b
): the rival loses with probability one if she chooses eﬀort from this
interval, even if the incumbent spends zero eﬀort, and hence, the rival’s eﬀort
would be purely wasted. Finally, note that the probability density must be
uniformly distributed in the interval (0, bB − a) for the incumbent and in
the interval [a
b
, B) for the rival. For instance, for the incumbent, this can be
seen as follows. It must hold that the incumbent is indiﬀerent whether he
increases his eﬀort marginally or not, for all eﬀort choices from this interval.
The cost of an additional marginal unit of eﬀort is 1. The benefit of this
marginal unit is the incumbent’s valuation B of winning, times the increase
in the probability of winning the contest. This additional probability is
equal to F¯ 0(w¯)1
b
. Accordingly, equalization of marginal cost and marginal
benefit requires F¯ 0(w¯) = b/B. Similar reasoning applies to the rival entrant
and requires uniform distribution of the incumbent’s eﬀort on the interval
(0, bB − a).
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Lemma 2 For a given prize of size B > 0 and contest success function (2),
if the contestants make simultaneous eﬀort choices w ≥ 0 and w¯ ≥ 0, the
equilibrium payoﬀ for the incumbent is (1− b)B + a if B(k) > a
b
and equal
to B if B ≤ a
b
. The rival entrant always has an equilibrium payoﬀ equal to
zero.
Lemma 2 can be confirmed using any eﬀort from the equilibrium support
in (5) and (6) to calculate the equilibrium payoﬀs for the case B > a
b
and
using w = w¯ = 0 for the case B ≤ a
b
. The payoﬀ for the rival is always zero.
The incumbent’s payoﬀ equals (1− b)B + a, or B, depending on whether a
contest takes place.
Consider now the incumbent’s incentive to invest in period 1. By lemma
2, if and only if the incumbent invests not more than a threshold level K
given by
B(K) = a/b, (7)
then the prize is small enough in relation to the headstart advantage so that
no contest occurs. Also by lemma 2, the incumbent’s overall expected payoﬀ
as a function of k is given by
Ω(k) =
½
−k +B(k) for k < K
−k + (1− b)B(k) + a for k ≥ K . (8)
Notice that this payoﬀ is continuous in k. Let ks (with s for ’security’) be
defined by
B0(ks) = 1. (9)
This is the amount the incumbent would choose to invest if he knew that
there would be no contest next period. Thus, if ks ≤ K, then this is what
the incumbent invests and the equilibrium involves no contest. Let kc (with
c for ’conflict’) be defined by
(1− b)B0(kc) = 1. (10)
This is the amount the incumbent would choose to invest if he knew that
there would be a contest next period such that his marginal benefit from
investment is deflated by (1− b). Since B0 > 0 > B00, we have kc < ks for all
b in (0, 1). Thus, if K < kc < ks, the incumbent chooses kc, and a conflict
ensues with eﬀort functions given by (5) and (6). Finally, if kc < K < ks,
the incumbent chooses K; that is, the incumbent does better to invest just
small enough to ensure no conflict than to invest such that a conflict ensues.
Figure 1 illustrates the three cases. The two downward sloping curves are
B0(k) and (1− b)B0(k). K is determined where B(K) =
R K
0
B0(k)dk = a/b.
In case (i) the opportunity cost curve (parallel line to the k−axis at unity)
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intersects B0(k) to the left of K and the intersection determines ks. In cases
(ii) and (iii) the opportunity cost curve intersects B0(k) to the right of K.
Accordingly, the choice of investment ks would lead to a contest, making the
marginal investment at ks not worthwhile. The incumbent chooses kc if the
marginal benefit of investment atK exceeds unity, that is, if (1−b)B0(K) > 1.
This is case (iii). Finally, Figure 1 illustrates the case (ii) with B0(K) > 1 >
(1− b)B0(K).
B'(k)
(1-b)B'(k)
K k
k
1
B'(k)
(1-b)B'(k)
K k
k
1
B'(k)
(1-b)B'(k)
K k
k
1
ks kc
Case (ii) Case (iii)Case (i)
Figu re 1
These considerations are summarized as a proposition:
Proposition 1 The (unique) subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized as
follows.
(i) If K > ks, then the equilibrium amount of investment is ks. Equilibrium
contest eﬀorts are w = w¯ = 0.
(ii) If ks > K > kc, then the equilibrium amount of investment is K. Equi-
librium contest eﬀorts are w = w¯ = 0.
(iii) If kc > K, then the equilibrium investment is kc, and equilibrium contest
eﬀort distributions are F and F¯ as described by (5) and (6).
The welfare loss in these equilibria compared to a situation in which there
is no contest, and in which the incumbent can be sure to earn B(k) of the
return on the investment is two-fold. First, there is a reduction in investment
compared to ks in cases (ii) and (iii). This reduction in investment is a
distortion and generates a welfare loss. This welfare loss is particularly large
9
if the investment is already distorted at ks, that is, if B0(k) < f 0(k). Further,
if there is a contest, as in case (iii), the expected eﬀort which the incumbent
and the rival spend in this appropriation contest is an additional welfare loss,
equal to the sum of contest eﬀorts, i.e., equal to bB(k)− a.
4 Properties of the equilibrium
The equilibria characterized in Proposition 1 have several interesting com-
parative static properties. We consider productivity changes and the rela-
tionship between an incumbent’s probability for staying in oﬃce, the type of
incumbency advantages, and investment incentives.
Productivity shifts. Consider a small shift of the function B(k) to some
B˜(k) with B˜0(k) > B0(k) for all k ≥ 0. This change may be induced by an
increase in the genuine productivity of the investment, an exogenous appre-
ciation of assets controlled by the period-2 incumbent, or by an increase in
the share that can be appropriated by the winner of the contest.
Proposition 2 Consider a small shift of the function B(k) to some B˜(k)
with B˜0(k) > B0(k) for all k ≥ 0. If ks < K then this shift increases equi-
librium investment to k˜s such that B˜0(k˜s) = 1. If kc > K then this shift
increases equilibrium investment to k˜c, such that (1 − b)B˜0(k˜c) = 1. If
ks > K > kc , then this shift reduces the equilibrium investment from K
to K˜ with B˜(K˜) = a/b.
The result is straightforward from Figure 1. Suppose the bold parts of
the curves B0(k) and (1− b)B0(k) shift upward. This implies that ks and kc
in cases (i) and (iii) move to the right. Further, the amount K of investment
at which B(K) =
R K
0
B0(k)dk = a/b shifts to the left. ¤
The critical investment level at which the prize becomes suﬃciently large
to trigger a contest becomes smaller if the investment becomes more produc-
tive or if the output becomes more valuable, or if the winner of the contest
can appropriate a larger share of the output. Accordingly, if the equilib-
rium investment level is this critical level K, an increase in productivity or
an improvement in the appropriation technology will reduce the equilibrium
level. In order to keep future contestable rents below the threshold that is
determined by the (exogenously given) headstart incumbency advantage, the
incumbent has to reduce his investment.14
14The results in proposition 2 are based on the kink in the payoﬀ function and resemble
some preemption games in industrial organization. For instance, Fudenberg, Gilbert,
Stiglitz and Tirole (1983) show that it depends on the value of a patent, and the size of
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Security and investment behavior. The case-(ii) equilibrium with invest-
ment equal to K in Proposition 1 shows that, even if no contest eﬀort is
observed, and no oﬃce change takes place, the investment disincentives due
to potential conflict can be large. For instance, for the extreme case with
a = 0 and b = 1, there is no conflict in the equilibrium, and at the same time,
there is zero investment. The two types of incumbency advantages work into
the same direction in the case-(ii) equilibrium: by (7), dK
da
= 1/(bB0(K)) > 0,
and dK
db
= −B/(bB0) < 0.
The diﬀerent dimensions of incumbency advantages aﬀect investment dif-
ferently in the case-(iii) equilibrium in which a contest occurs. By (5) and (6)
the equilibrium probability for staying in oﬃce is π(a, b,B) = 1 − b
2
+ a
2
2bB2
,
whereas the investment disincentives are characterized by (1− b) at the mar-
gin in this equilibrium. Accordingly, starting from some situation in which
the equilibrium investment is kc, there are many combinations (a, b) of head-
start advantages and productivity advantages that lead to the same proba-
bility of an oﬃce change and very diﬀerent equilibrium investment levels.
These comparative static properties show that the observed frequency of
turnover is neither a good predictor for an incumbent’s security, nor for his
investment incentives.
5 Evidence
This section confronts the theory results with some piecemeal evidence on
dictatorship and leadership in organizations. The analysis predicts that,
everything else given, there is a tendency for more conflict if there is more at
stake. This prediction is closely matched in the empirical data on civil war
and social conflict. Natural resource stocks are preferred sources of revenue
for the rulers, and generate a considerable incentive for rivals to enter into an
appropriation conflict. Indeed, a close relationship between countries’ stocks
of natural resources that can be acquired by a proprietary government and
conflict or civil war is found. Evidence for this close relationship is surveyed
in Collier (2001). He concludes, based on a number of empirical studies he
and his coauthors conducted, that for a broad range, the risk of rebellion
is increasing in primary commodity dependence of a country. Accordingly,
an unexpected appreciation of a country’s stock of natural resources, or the
discovery of such resources destabilizes the system and generates conflict.
Further, this paper suggests that dictators’ investment behavior depends
on their incumbency advantages. The evidence on this is less systematic.
information lags between firms whether a firm’s headstart advantage eliminates a patent
race.
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We may compare two countries, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, the largest oil
exporters among Arabian and African countries, respectively.
Saudi Arabia is characterized by a stable monarchy which traces back to
the 18th century and is deeply rooted in the history of the Arabian peninsula,
and in religion (Hopwood, 1982). On a scale from 1 (least fractionalized) to
100 (most fractionalized), Saudi Arabia earns a ”6” for ethno-linguistic frac-
tionalization (see Mauro, 1995). Even though fractionalization of countries is
not necessarily exogenous this could be a proxy for incumbency advantages.
Hence, our theory predicts use of oil revenues for building up infrastructure
and for investing in education and in state owned foreign assets. Indeed,
the incentives of the kingdom to invest have been expressed by government
oﬃcials (see, e.g., Abdullah al Saud, in: Niblock, 1982, p.304), and Saudi
Arabia has invested a major share of petroleum income in infrastructure,
education, and in building up non-oil industries.15
Nigeria, the largest oil exporter in Africa, has an ’87’ on the ethno-
linguistic fractionalization index (Mauro, 1995). It had 11 country leaders
since 1960, eight of which were military. Five were replaced by a coup. One
was assassinated, one ”stepped aside” and one ”resigned” after less than one
year in oﬃce (Economist, January 15, 2000, p.4). Nigerian rulers face com-
petition for oﬃce. Nigeria could be a prosperous country and could have
invested its oil money in education, infrastructure or state owned foreign
assets. Instead, per-capital income in nominal US dollars decreased to less
than 1/3 of what it was in 1980 (Economist, January 15, 2000, p.5), country
leaders preferred to accumulate assets on their own foreign accounts, and
when the latest change in oﬃce took place and Olusegun Obasanjo returned
to oﬃce in 1999, he inherited a country that lacks infrastructure but accu-
mulated a stock of public debt to foreigners of USD 30b. (Simon Robinson,
Time Europe, December 27, 1999). While this paper cannot provide a sys-
tematic empirical analysis, these examples could be suggestive for what could
be the direction of such an analysis.
Turning to organizational aspects of firms, the relationship between in-
cumbency advantages and managerial incentives can be used to discuss some
of the empirical results on CEO turnover and firm profitability. Considerable
evidence shows a negative correlation between firm performance and CEO
turnover.16 This correlation is typically interpreted as evidence for CEO
15For instance, the Saudi Arabian ’second five-year plan’ for 1975-1980, proposed devel-
opment expenditure amounted to USD 142b., about four times the GDP at that time, and
the non-oil sector grew with annual real rates of between 12.9 and 19.6 percent between
1972 and 1976 (Moliver and Abbondante, 1980, p.2 and p.42).
16Some references confirming this are Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), Weisbach
(1988) and Kaplan (1992). See also Conyon, Gregg and Machin (1995) for a survey.
12
turnover to be a disciplinatory instrument. The results in this paper suggest
that a diﬀerent causality could also contribute to this correlation: suppose a
CEO has strong headstart advantages. This can lead to a low probability of
losing the struggle for power and being replaced and can generate incentives
to increase firm growth and profits, provided that the CEO’s incentives are
somewhat aligned with shareholders’ goals by other incentive instruments.
Incumbency advantages could therefore be a hidden variable that contributes
to the correlation between CEO turnover and firm performance. Incum-
bency advantages may have several causes, some of which are observable,
and this is where an empirical analysis could start. Change in legislation
may change incumbency advantages. The homogeneity of the industry in
which a firm operates could have an impact on the cost of replacement of the
CEO, and lower replacement cost reduces incumbency advantages.17 Also, a
CEO can increase incumbency advantages by manager-specific investments.
Some costs and benefits of such investment have been discussed by Shleifer
and Vishny (1989) and Mitusch (2000). The results in this paper suggest a
further reason why manager-specific investment could be beneficial, not only
for the manager, but also for the shareholders.
6 Some generalizations
In this section a number of assumptions is briefly discussed: timing of moves,
the contest function, constrained budgets for contest eﬀort, and additional
and countervailing aspects of infrastructure investment.
Timing of moves. Three decisions are made: k, w, and w¯. The interesting
aspect of k here is its role as a strategic variable: the incumbent can choose
k and influence the rival’s behavior in the contest. This is why consideration
is restricted to k being chosen before w¯. However, there is no need for
w and w¯ to be chosen simultaneously. If, for some reason, the rival has
to choose her contest eﬀort before the period-1 incumbent, if a > 0 and
b < 1, the incumbent would always top any reasonable eﬀort spent by the
rival and hence, the equilibrium is characterized by w = w¯ = 0, and by an
investment level that is given by (9). Accordingly, for this type of timing,
the hold-up problem disappears. If, instead, w can be chosen prior to w¯18,
the equilibrium does not change much. The incumbent chooses a suﬃcient
17For instance, Geddes and Vinod (1997) report that homogeneity of the industry de-
creases the duration of the CEO’s stay.
18Lundahl’s (1992) account of Haiti’s history prior to and during Duvalier’s dictatorship
serves as a case study that highlights the role of investment in a dictator’s security and
may also serve as an example for a change from a regime with Nash contests for power to
Stackelberg leadership. Haiti had 22 rulers from 1843 to 1915, eleven of them ousted within
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amount of eﬀort to prevent the rival from entering the contest and the rival
stays out (w = max[bB(k) − a, 0] and w¯ = 0). Investment and welfare are
the same as in the case with simultaneous contests. The incumbent stays in
power in this case with probability 1, however.
Contest functions. The contest function (2) is sometimes considered an
extreme case because it is the limiting case of a more general class of contest
success functions for which the win probability is a continuous function of
eﬀort that has been axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996). The results in proposi-
tions 1 and 2 are very general and also hold for incumbency advantages with
this general class of contest success functions. For instance, consider the
famous Tullock (1980) contest success function, augmented by a headstart
advantage: suppose the winning probability of the incumbent is
q(w, w¯) =
w + a
w + w¯ + a
, (11)
and the rival wins with probability (1− q). In the resulting contest equilib-
rium, contestants choose eﬀorts w = (B/4) − a and w¯ = B/4 if B(k) > 4a,
w = 0 and w¯ =
√
aB − a if B(k) ∈ (a, 4a], and w = w¯ = 0 for B(k) < a.
Substituting in (3) yields an equilibrium payoﬀ Ω(k) for the incumbent, with
dΩ(k)
dk
=



−1 +B0(k) if B(k) < a
−1 + 1
2
√
a√
B
B0(k) if B(k) ∈ (a, 4a]
−1 + 1
4
B0(k) if B(k) ≥ 4a
. (12)
The derivative dΩ(k)
dk
is not defined at B(k) = a. We define the amount of
investment for which B(k) = a as K, analogously to (7). Note that we
consider only a headstart advantage here, hence, b = 1. At K the marginal
payoﬀ of an increase in investment drops from (−1+B0(K)) to (−1+ 1
2
B0(K)).
This discontinuity is caused by the fact that the rival chooses w¯ = 0 for
k < K, and starts choosing positive eﬀort for k > K. The same three types
of possible equilibrium as in proposition 1 can occur: an equilibrium in the
range k < K, in which no contest occurs, an equilibrium in the range k > K,
in which the rival or both the rival and the incumbent spend positive contest
eﬀort, and an equilibrium with k = K, in which the incumbent preempts
a contest by choosing a suﬃciently low investment. Also the qualitative
properties of these equilibria are the same as in proposition 2. In particular,
the same counterintuitive result about an increase in investment productivity
in an equilibrium at K obtains: if B(k) is replaced by B˜(k) with B˜0(k) >
less than one year. Duvalier, however, made every eﬀort and employed vast resources to
fight all possible opposition in his first 5 years of oﬃce, and, by continuing to spend
considerable resources, he and his family ruled the country for more than 26 years.
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B0(k), the threshold amount of investmentK reduces to K˜ that is determined
by B˜(K˜) = a , and so does the equilibrium investment for changes in B(k)
for which the equilibrium stays in the threshold.
Constrained budgets. An important aspect that is neglected here is the
fact that the incumbent or the rival or both may be budget constrained. The
problem disappears if there are perfect credit markets, but in a world without
property rights, capital markets are typically incomplete. Two super-powers
may back up the contestants in the proprietary state, in which case the bud-
get constraints disappear. If only the rival is budget constrained, the contest
equilibrium as in lemma 1 is replaced by an equilibrium that generalizes the
analysis by Che and Gale (1998), and the investment disincentives that are
generated by the contest are expected to be less strong. The problem be-
comes more complex if the incumbent faces a budget constraint and uses the
same type of resources for making investment and for contest eﬀort, as is as-
sumed in general equilibrium models as considered in Skaperdas (1992) or in
Konrad and Skaperdas (1999) where a fixed budget can be allocated among
various uses, such as production, protection, appropriation and others, or if
resources have to be allocated between several periods of conflict.
Additional eﬀects of investment. So far, it has been assumed that the
investment changes the prize, but does not change the contest technology.
However, investment may also change incumbency advantages. For instance,
applied to the proprietary state, investment in infrastructure or education
may induce growth, making people happier with their ruler, and this may
stabilize the ruler’s regime. This has been claimed and analyzed in the con-
text of proprietary finance, by Grossman (1991, 1999) and Grossman and
Noh (1994). Alternatively, economic development may induce political tran-
sition and generate a politically active opposition. Hence, investment may
reduce political stability. Robinson (1999) surveys historical evidence and an
analysis showing that policies that promote economic development can aﬀect
the distribution of political power to the disadvantage of the ruling elite.
The eﬀect of investment on, for instance, the headstart advantage can be
incorporated in the analysis in sections 2 and 3. Suppose, for instance, that
a = a(k). To make the problem well-behaved, suppose further a(0) > 0, and
a0(k)
b
< B0(k). The latter condition is clearly fulfilled if investment reduces
incumbency advantages, and also holds if investment increases incumbency
advantages only moderately. The contest equilibria as characterized in lem-
mas 1 and 2 are unaﬀected, as a(k) is given at the contest stage. However, the
incumbent will take into account that investment also changes his headstart
advantage. Equilibria with investment levels, ks and kc, respectively, and
their comparative static properties with respect to B(k), do not change, as a
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does not even enter the conditions (9) and (10) determining these investment
levels. The equilibrium at the threshold level of investment K, at which a
contest sets in, changes, but not much. The threshold level is characterized
now by B(K) = a(k)
b
, and this equation has (at most) one solution. Also the
comparative statics of this equilibrium stay qualitatively the same. However,
the overall eﬀect of an increase in B(k) is reinforced if a0(k) < 0, and reduced
if a0(k) > 0. But these eﬀects add to the eﬀect considered in this paper, and
do not eliminate it.
7 Conclusions
In many situations economic agents who can make an investment that gener-
ates output in the future must enter a contest for appropriating this output.
This paper analyzed the investment incentives of such agents and the role
of incumbency advantages in the contest. An increase in the productivity of
the investment can decrease or increase the amount of investment. This is
particularly important if a certain amount of investment triggers a contest
for the output of such investment. The agent who can choose the amount of
investment then may want to keep the output below this critical level, and if
the investment becomes more productive, investment may fall. These results
reveal two types of welfare losses. Losses occur in terms of the appropriation
eﬀort that is spent in the contest about who appropriates the returns on the
investment. Second, because these eﬀort costs are triggered by the returns
of the investment there is an incentive for unterinvestment. The results are
applied to dictators’ investment behavior, and managers’ investment in or-
ganizations. In the context of proprietary states, the results lead to testable
hypotheses and can explain, for instance, why dictators with similar objec-
tives may choose very diﬀerent policies as regards the economic development
of their countries.
8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. A strict proof of uniqueness of the equilibrium in case
(i) follows lines drawn by Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996).19 We only
confirm that (5) and (6) indeed constitute an equilibrium. For this it must
hold that, for given F as defined in (5), all choices w¯ ∈ {0}∪ [a
b
, B] yield the
same payoﬀ for the rival, a payoﬀ not lower than any choice from outside this
19Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996) consider a special case that is isomorphic to the
case with a = 0.
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set. Inserting in the payoﬀ function shows that any choice w¯ ∈ {0} ∪ [a
b
, B]
yields Φ = 0, whereas a choice of w¯ ∈ (0, a
b
) yields a strictly negative payoﬀ
equal to −w¯, and a choice w¯ > B yields strictly negative payoﬀ equal to
−(w¯ −B).
Similarly, it must hold that, for given F¯ as defined in (6), all w ∈ [0, bB−a]
yield the same expected payoﬀ not lower than the payoﬀ attained with any
other choice of w. Indeed, inserting (5) and (6) in the incumbent’s payoﬀ
function shows that all these choices yield payoﬀ equal to (1 − b)B + a. If
the incumbent chooses eﬀort higher than bB−a, his payoﬀ is reduced by the
diﬀerence w − (bB − a) as he already wins the contest with probability one
if he chooses w = bB − a.
The case (ii) with B < a
b
is comparatively simple. The rival cannot win
unless he spends eﬀort that exceeds B, his valuation of the prize. But his
payoﬀ in these cases is negative and hence smaller than for w¯ = 0 which
is a unique dominant strategy. The incumbent’s optimal response to this
dominant strategy is w = 0. ¤
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